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Google and 
the trans-Atlantic 
antitrust abyss
1. In June 2017, DG COMP, the competition arm of the European Commission
and Europe’s principal antitrust enforcer, finally concluded its investigation
into Google’s search business, identifying a clear and aggravated infringement
of Article  102, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.1 After an
eight-year investigation and three attempts at settlement, the Commission
imposed a EUR 2.42 billion fine, thereby doubling the ceiling on fines against
individual firms. The Google Search (Shopping) decision also ordered Google
to remedy the abuse within 90 days or face daily penalties of up to 5% of global
group turnover.2 As the search bias issue was only one of six charges levied against 
the firm, the  June 2017 decision were followed by a EUR 4.34  billion fine on
Android3 in 2018 and a EUR 1.49 billion fine on AdSense4 in 2019, with further
cases pending.5 In stark contrast to the outcome in the EU Google Search case,
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2013 declined to pursue charges
against Google for the same alleged conduct.6 While the decision may have been
a close call, it stands as a unanimous decision by all five Commissioners not to
attempt to build a case against Google search and in principle acquitting the firm
of wrongdoing under the U.S. antitrust laws.
2. Because the complaints against Google search to the antitrust authorities in
the EU and the U.S. were more or less identical, the two competition authorities
investigated the same alleged anticompetitive conduct. It is useful, therefore,
to compare and explain the proceedings and their opposite outcomes. One can
contemplate, for example, whether the FTC’s decision to stand down represents a
better balancing of interests in the application of antitrust law than the approach
taken in the EU, with its arguably draconian outcome, and whether a U.S. court
would have sided with the government had the FTC chosen to pursue a case
against Google. Although this exercise involves second guessing that requires
caution, it provides the context for a direct comparison of U.S. and EU antitrust
principles and can shed light on whether any legal elements embedded in the two
jurisdictions create different outcomes in otherwise identical cases.
3. The article proceeds in four parts. First, we offer some general background
remarks on Google and the Google services implicated in the two proceedings.
In the second part we examine the EU Google Search decision and its legal
foundations. No comments are offered on the Android and AdSense Decisions
as neither have been published. Next, we analyze the FTC’s rationale for closing
its investigation into Google search. Finally, we compare the two legal regimes
1  Case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping).
2  See Case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recital 700 for a summary of  the obligations.
3  Case 40.099 – Google Android.
4  Case 40.411 – Google Search (AdSense).
5  Neither have been published and no analysis will be attempted on these.
6  Statement of  the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In re Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163 
January 3, 2013.
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ABSTRACT
During the late 2000s, several jurisdictions, 
including the EU and the U.S., opened 
investigations into potential antitrust 
violations by the Internet search firm, 
Google, for alleged bias in the ranking 
of the links returned in response to search 
queries. While the EU investigations in 2017 
resulted in a record EUR 2.42 billion fine 
(followed by further in 2018 and 2019), 
the U.S. proceeding came to a close in 2013 
with a brief statement by the Federal Trade 
Commission exonerating Google of antitrust 
law violations. These diametrically opposed 
outcomes occurred despite the similarity 
at the core of the single-firm antitrust doctrine 
that prevails on the two sides of the Atlantic 
and the near indistinguishability of the factual 
allegations of Google’s conduct raised 
in the two jurisdictions. In this paper, 
we outline and compare the merits 
of the two cases in an attempt to reconcile 
the different outcomes, with a particular focus 
on the theories of harm examined by the two 
agencies and the supporting evidence 
they considered. 
À la fin des années 2000, plusieurs juridictions, 
y compris dans l’UE et les US, ont ouvert 
des enquêtes sur de potentielles violations 
des lois antitrust de la part de l’entreprise 
de recherche internet Google pour partialité 
présumée dans l’évaluation de liens donnée 
en réponse à des demandes de recherches 
en ligne. Alors qu’en 2017 les enquêtes 
UE ont abouti à une amende record de 
2 milliards et 42 millions (suivie par 
d’autres en 2018 et 2019), la procédure 
US s’est achevée en 2013 par une courte 
déclaration de la Federal Trade Commission 
qui exonérait Google de toute violation 
des lois antitrust. Ces deux aboutissements 
diamétralement opposés ont eu lieu malgré 
la similitude de fond de la doctrine antitrust 
de l’entreprise unique qui prévaut des deux 
côtés de l’Atlantique et la quasi impossibilité 
de discerner les allégations factuelles 
de la conduite de Google soulevée dans 
les deux juridictions. Dans cet article, 
nous décrivons et comparons les mérites 
des deux cas en essayant de réconcilier 
les différents bilans, avec une attention 
particulière sur les théories du préjudice 
examinées par les deux organismes 
et les preuves à l’appui qu’elles ont prises 
en considération.
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by analyzing the likely outcome of hypothetical litigation 
against Google had the FTC decided to challenge the 
conduct described by the evidence adduced in the EU 
proceeding. While necessarily speculative, we think this 
exercise represents a reasonable approach to illustrating 
the merits of the antitrust case against Google search 
in the wider context of the doctrinal and procedural 
features of the EU and U.S. antitrust enforcement 
regimes. In conclusion, we tentatively identify the 
features and approach of each regime that may account 
for the dramatically different outcomes on the two sides 
of the Atlantic.
4. To the extent documentation was available, we found 
the legal considerations taken by the two competition 
authorities to have been strikingly similar, which only 
obscures the reasons for the opposite outcomes. We 
ultimately conclude that, in at least this instance, the 
EU authorities implemented a broader legal standard 
than did the FTC, which appears to have struggled with 
applying a net consumer welfare standard in the high-
tech Internet search market. Since DG COMP’s decision 
did not expressly state the legal standard to be applied 
to the challenged conduct, it can be inferred that the EU 
implemented some version of the ordoliberal enforcement 
approach, by which governmental intervention is 
appropriate to protect (“order”) the process of market 
competition and does not depend on a showing that a 
particular form of allegedly anticompetitive conduct is 
likely to generate a net negative welfare effect. Under 
such a standard, a reduction in consumer choice could be 
sufficient to warrant condemnation of the conduct. 
I. The Google brand 
and services offered
5.  Google, whose parent corporation was renamed 
Alphabet Inc. in 2016, was established in 1998 as a 
two-sided platform that allows users to search the Internet 
at no charge while offering advertisers the privilege of 
appearing in or near the search results or on web pages 
listed in those results.7 Google interacts with the users 
by providing generic search results8 in response to the 
entry of an inquiry.9 The results have been generated 
by progressively more advanced search algorithms that 
over the years has evolved to include an analysis of users’ 
7  A two-sided platform should not be confused with a two-sided market, see S.  Broos 
and J.  Marcos Ramos, Google, Google Shopping and Amazon: The Importance of  
Competing Business Models and Two-Sided Intermediaries in Defining Relevant Markets 
(November  27,  2015). The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol.  62, Issue  2 (2017). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2696045. 
8  Sometimes also referred to as natural search result or organic search result cf. case AT.39.740 
– Google Search (Shopping), Recital 10, note 8. In accordance with DG COMP preference 
generic will be used in this paper. 
9  Sometimes referred to as Search Engine Result Pages (SERF). Moreover, the delivery of  
generic search results involves three automated processes: crawling, indexing and serving 
cf. Case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recital 15. For a walkthrough of  search 
engines, their functionality and economics, see M. Herz (2014). Google Search and the Law 
on Dominance in the EU: An Assessment of  the Compatibility of  Current Methodology with 
Multi-Sided Platforms in Online Search. SSRN, pp. 1–20.
choices, referred to as “click-through rates,”10 which 
feedback into the algorithm to generate better and more 
precise results. In addition to the generic, unsponsored 
results, additional results are provided today in the 
form of (i) sponsored ads and links normally displayed 
above the generic results, and, (ii) commercial products, 
services, and information, normally provided in separate 
boxes. Thus, rather than a single response to an inquiry, 
Google now provides three separate sets of search 
results,11 two of which lead to Google-affiliated services, 
in addition to the generic search results.12 On  account 
of this blend of search results, Google prefers to term it 
service “Universal” rather than what later will be referred 
to as “general and specialized” searches. 
6. Google interacts with advertisers through its AdWords 
and AdSense services and certain specialized Google 
services. AdWords provides a platform for advertisers 
to bid on keywords for placement in “sponsored” search 
results returned when the keyword is used in the search 
string. Advertisers pay Google each time a user clicks on 
one of their links. AdSense extends AdWords to display 
ads on other websites and allows for elaborate content, 
including text, images, and video and the management of 
advertisements across the Internet.
7.  Although Internet search is free, it benefits Google 
by providing the company with information about the 
user that contributes to developing and maintaining 
Google’s proprietary algorithms and its store of 
consumer data, which can be profitably exploited by 
advertisers. As for monetary income, AdWords accounts 
for most of Google’s search revenue, while AdSense 
generates somewhat less revenue.13 Additional services, 
often with dedicated websites, were launched starting in 
2001, including Google Images (2001), Froogle (2002), 
later re-branded as Google Product Search (2007) and 
eventually Google Shopping (2012), Google Maps 
(2004), and Google Flights (2011),14 offering images, 
shopping, maps and travel services. Such services with a 
narrow focus on a specific subject matter are commonly 
distinguished from services that offer a general search 
across the entire Internet, with the former frequently 
referred to as specialized (vertical) search and the latter 
as general (horizontal) search.15 While convergence in 
10  FTC Memorandum dated August 8, 2012 on Google Inc, File No. 111-0163, p. 14.
11  In reality Google might today provide more than three searches as new info-boxes appear to 
have been incorporated and blended with the generic results.
12  See, e.g., case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recitals 8–37 for more about Google 
search engines and the display of  the different search results.
13  Case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recitals 7 and 296, referring to Alphabet’s US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, Annual Report for the fiscal year ending 
31 December 2016.
14  The product description is taken from the outline provided in case AT.39.740 – Google 
Search (Shopping), Recitals 27–31, that presents additional Google services. For further 
on the evolution of  Internet searches see M.  A. Salinger & R.  J. Levinson, Economics 
and the FTC’s Google Investigation, 46 Rev. Indus. Org. 25 (2015), pp. 32–42 and FTC 
Memorandum dated August 8, 2012 on Google Inc, File No. 111-0163.
15  In addition to specialized search and vertical search, the term universal search, which blends 
these, is also used, cf. case  AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recital  10, note  9. 
However, it appears that DG COMP uses universal search as an alternative for vertical search 
rather than the blended search.
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the longer run is plausible, these two services provide in 
principle two competing ways of accessing information 
available on the Internet.16 Initially, the emergence of 
specialized search had little effect on Google’s business 
model, because merchants did not pay to be listed 
in Froogle or Google Product Search, which were 
monetized through advertising. In 2012 Google modified 
its business model by instituting a charge to merchants 
for each click on their product in what was relabeled as 
Google Shopping. 
8.  In  2007, Google included a new feature by which 
general search results were returned with additional 
information, which included a “shopping function,” 
called Product Universal, later renamed Commercial 
Unit and then Shopping Unit. These products display 
search results from a Google-affiliated specialized search 
engine, such as Google Shopping, in dedicated boxes,17 
accompanied by pictures and essential information, 
such as product prices.18 By extracting relevant content 
from specialized Google services and displaying it in a 
separate box alongside general search results, Google 
Search has added functionality that allows its general 
search services to substitute for specialized search 
engines, which motivates Google to brand its service as 
Universal Search, because all the categories of results are 
provided in response to a single query. More specifically, 
Google provides three categories of search results, a set 
of relevant ads, content in the box, and the generic search 
results. Only the first category of results generates direct 
revenue (through AdWords, which remains Google’s 
predominant source of income), although its specialized 
search services and the Shopping Unit also provide 
significant indirect revenue.19 
9. Indications of self-favoritism and bias in search results 
emerged as early as 2007,20 leading to the perception that 
Google did not always provide the most relevant reply 
to a search inquiry. Ultimately, these perceptions resulted 
in formal complaints to the U.S. and EU antitrust 
authorities.21 Notably, the U.S. investigation examined 
Google’s policies relating to all services placed in the box, 
16  See case  AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recitals 166–177 for further on the 
differences and M.  A. Salinger & R.  J. Levinson, Economics and the FTC’s Google 
Investigation, 46 Rev. Indus. Org. 25 (2015), pp. 32–42 for an outline of  the development of  
Internet searches, including Google first specialized searches.
17  It’s unclear whether Google operates one or several separate info boxes. The labels OneBox 
and Knowledge Panels are both used, suggesting the appearance of  different boxes and 
functionalities. For simplicity, however, the paper will assume that there is only one box that 
differs in content depending upon the nature of  the search query. 
18  In the process of  renaming the services Google also adjusted it function as the Shopping 
Unit, in contrast to the earlier Product Universal lead users directly to the pages of  Google’ 
merchant partner, where the user can purchase the products cf. case  AT.39.740 – Google 
Search (Shopping), Recital 32.
19  The issue of  profitability of  different Google products, and how Google lacks an incentive 
to attempt a foreclosure of  dependent or downstream markets, are often used to refute any 
search bias as Google lack incentive to pursue such strategy. This paper offers no opinion 
on the matter.
20  Letter from Senators Herb Kohl and Mike Lee to Jonathan D. Liebowitz, December 19, 
2011, at p. 3 referring to a speech delivered by a Google executive.
21  Descriptions of  the complainants and their grievances can be found at www.fairsearch.org 
and at www.searchneutrality.org. Moreover, complaints have been lodged in several other 
jurisdictions. However, this paper will limit itself  to EU and US with a few references to a 
German and UK case.
while the EU (initially) was more narrowly focused on 
favoritism toward Google Shopping. In further contrast 
to the EU, the FTC appears to have perceived the box 
and the concept of Universal search as improvements to 
Google’s general search service, and therefore beneficial 
to consumers, a likely factor contributing to the different 
outcomes.
II. The EU Google 
Search decision
10.  Despite meting out the largest fine in EU antitrust 
history, indicating that the European Commission must 
have considered Google’s conduct to have been a clear 
and most grave competition law violation, the reasoning 
and analysis behind its 2017 Google Search decision is 
neither clear nor straightforward. The decision easily 
could have come out differently had the authorities 
given more weight to Google’s defenses to the alleged 
wrongdoing, as did the FTC in the U.S. decision. There 
is reason to believe that initially they did so. On three 
occasions DG COMP attempted to close its proceeding 
with behavioral commitments by the accused violator. 
Nonetheless, the Commission ultimately decided to 
advance the case under a novel and untested theory of 
harm. It is unclear, therefore, whether the EU Courts 
will be receptive to the merits of the decision when called 
upon to review it.22 The outcome of the pending appeal, 
therefore, is not a foregone conclusion. The analysis of 
the EU Google Search decision starts with a review of the 
decision’s operative parts followed by a dissection of its 
legal principles.
1. A long, slow road from 2009 
to 2017
11. In November 2009, Foundem, a shopping and price 
comparison website, lodged a complaint with DG COMP 
over the results to search inquiries entered on www.
google.com and corresponding national search services 
operated under the Google brand.23 The complaint 
alleged that rather than directing end-users to the most 
relevant Internet pages, the results were biased in favor 
of Google-affiliated offerings. For merchants appearing 
in both unpaid and paid search results, such behavior 
translated into a lower listing in the index of sites, 
resulting in a less favorable position on the list of results 
returned to end-users. Moreover, because end-users are 
reluctant to consider more than the first three to five links 
returned,24 to appear below these levels is tantamount to 
not being displayed at all, which, according to Foundem, 
22  The decision has been challenged as case T-612/17 – Google and Alphabet. O.J. 2017C 369, p. 37.
23  See press release from the Commission  30 November 2010 – IP /10/1624 – Antitrust: 
Commission probes allegations of  antitrust violations by Google.
24  See case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recitals 453–457 and 535. Ce
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was how Google’s conduct had injured them.25 Of course, 
Google denied any wrongdoing, but in the course of 
2010 additional complainants urging other grievances 
came forward,26 eventually emerging as additional 
substantive allegations.27 In addition to the alleged 
bias in search results, the complainants also alleged 
that Google (i)  made use of unlicensed content from 
unaffiliated websites, a practice called “scraping,” and, 
(ii) forced publishers and advertisers into exclusive use of 
Google’s AdSense and AdWords services with the intent 
to foreclose rival platforms from the market for online 
search advertising.
12.  Google quickly relented on the use of exclusive 
agreements,28 which allowed DG COMP to concentrate 
on the issues of search bias and scraping, although 
the latter more resembled an IP infringement than an 
antitrust violation.29 These efforts led to three rounds of 
settlement negotiations, each of which were successful 
from the perspective of Google and DG COMP, but all 
of which were rejected when the terms of the settlements 
were circulated for consultations.30 Thereafter, during 
2014-15, DG  COMP chose to pursue the case to a 
formal decision,31 supplemented with new objections 
regarding Android, Google’s smartphone operating 
system.32 Although the Android matter is a separate 
proceeding, it involves some of the same concerns over 
self-dealing and Google’s leveraging of economic power 
into adjacent markets that motivated the investigation 
into general search. Accordingly, the EU’s approach in 
later proceedings is likely to rely on some of the same 
legal concepts and considerations as in the current case.33
25  Charles Arthur, Foundem accuses Google of  using its power to favour own links, 
The  Guardian  30 November 2010 and more recently Charles Duhigg The Case Against 
Google, New York Times 20 February 2018.
26  See case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recitals 39–95, for outline of  plaintiffs 
and other parties.
27  See memo from the Commission 25 April 2013 – Commission seeks feedback on commitments 
offered by Google to address competition concerns – questions and answers.
28  Google abandoned exclusivity, but DG COMP nonetheless issued a Statement of  Objection 
(SO) in 2016 indicating an intention of  reverting to the matter. See press release from the 
Commission  14 July 2016 – IP/16/2532 – Antitrust: Commission takes further steps in 
investigations alleging Google’s comparison shopping and advertising-related practices 
breach EU rules.
29  There is an antitrust element to the scrapping allegations, as Google appears to have used 
the scraped content to improve the quality and user experience of  Google service, and thus 
either strengthened its (potential) dominant position or leveraged this onto new markets 
and services.
30  Statement on the Google investigation by Commissioner Almunia 5 February 2014.
31  Embedded in the decision also appears to have been a decision to focus on the Sopping Unit 
and Google specialized shopping service rather than Product Universal and all specialized 
services as initially and in the FTC investigation.
32  Case 40.099 – Google Android. Delivered in July 2018. For further see press release from the 
Commission 18 July 2018 – IP/18/458 – Antitrust: commission fines google €4.34 billion 
for illegal practices regarding android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of  Google’s 
search engine.
33  For an analysis of  the Android case, see P. F. Todd Out for the box: illegal tying and Google’s 
suite of  apps for the Android OS, European Competition Journal, 2017 13:1, 62–92; F. Etro 
& C. Caffarra, On the economics of  the Android case, European Competition Journal 2017, 
13:2-3, pp. 282–313, and B. Edelman & D.  Geradin (2016) Android and competition 
law: exploring and assessing Google’s practice in mobile, European Competition Journal, 
Vol. 12:2–3, pp. 159–194.
2. The EU decision
13. The proceedings came to a climax in June 2017, with the 
release of the EU’s Google Search decision.34 DG COMP 
identified an abuse of a dominant position and doled 
out a record fine of EUR 2.42 billion (USD 2.97 billion). 
Compared to the 518-page Intel35 decision in 2009 or the 
302-page Microsoft36 decision in 2004, the  Commission’s 
216-page decision in Google Search was relatively brief. 
To some extent, its brevity follows from DG COMP’s focus 
on the search bias allegations and its deferral of the other 
charges for adjudication in separate proceedings. But its 
brevity is also a product of the vague theory of harm driving 
the case, which obviated the need for the Commission to 
explain how the evidence met the traditional legal stan-
dards for well-defined abuses. Google’s claim that it was 
found liable in the EU under a novel and unprecedented 
“abusive leverage” standard devoid of clear precedential 
support is not entirely unfounded.37 However, as we show 
below, it would be more accurate to claim the company was 
adjudged under an established standard, but where the case 
fell short of these requirements, with the ramification that 
DG COMP appeared to have been engaged in an attempt 
at redefining the case law rather than building upon it.38 
14. The finding of abuse is based on the presence of two 
vertically linked markets, an upstream general search 
market dominated by Google and a specialized search 
market that is competitive. In the upstream market the 
dominant provider purportedly maliciously downgrades 
search results in order to favor its own interests in the 
competitive downstream market.39 The downgrading was 
accomplished by (i) submitting competing offerings only 
to the generic search ranking algorithm, and (ii) reserving 
the best positioning in the generic search results and the 
separate box for Google’s own offerings.40 The decision 
stands for the proposition that these elements alone are 
sufficient to make out a claim for “abusive leveraging,” 
thereby injecting a concept of abuse into Article 102 that 
encompasses self-favoritism as a violation, or perhaps an 
even more expansive interpretation.
34  Case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping).
35  Case 37.990 – Intel.
36  Case 37.792 – Microsoft.
37  See case T-612/17 – Google and Alphabet. O.J. 2017C 369, p. 37, plea 5.
38  P. Akman, The Theory of  Abuse in Google Search: A Positive and Normative Assessment 
Under EU Competition Law, J. L. Tech. & Policy  2017, pp. 301–374, contemplates, but 
rejects, the ability to accommodate the behavior under a traditional standard of  abuse.
39  The Commission stopped short of  making an express finding of  malice or intent, but 
Commissioner Vestager did state the following at a press conference to announce the decision: 
“We haven’t found evidence of  intent when it comes to demoting other rivals, but what we have seen 
in the evidence is the fact that the Google comparison shopping services, Google Shopping, has 
been given a better treatment, a significantly better treatment, by being placed up front no matter the 
result of  the search query and the demotion of  rivals. That combination is what we have concluded 
is the abuse of  the dominant position.” Press  conference by Margrethe Vestager, European 
Commissioner for Competition on Google search (June 27, 2018), at 28:00, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref=I141016&sitelang=en&lg=INT.
40  See Recital 379. Pursuant to Recital 2, “The Decision establishes that the more favourable 
positioning and display by Google, in its general search results pages, of  its own comparison 
shopping service compared to competing comparison shopping services (the ‘Conduct’) 
infringes Article 102.” This indicates that reserving a better position rather than downgrading 
competing offerings constitutes the abuse, see, e.g., Recital 2. But see, e.g., Recitals 342 and 
344, which point to the combination as abusive. Ce
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2.1 A tale of two (and an extra) 
markets, with links
15. By definition, an abuse under Article 102 (and for the 
most part, a violation of the U.S. anti-monopolization 
law) requires the subject firm to be dominant in a 
relevant market. Such cases traditionally proceed 
from a comprehensive description and analysis of the 
market, the alleged conduct constituting the abuse, and 
the anticompetitive market effects alleged to follow. 
In this regard, the EU Google Search decision follows 
that tradition by identifying two product markets, both 
national in geographical scope, but implicitly also relying 
on a third. 41 These are:42 
–  General search market, in which services offer 
searches across the entire Internet for whatever 
query is entered in the search engine. General 
searches can be distinguished from other online 
services, such as,43 (i) content sites, like news-
groups, newspaper and information reposito-
ries, such as Wikipedia, (ii) social media sites, 
such as Facebook and LinkedIn, and, (iii) 
specialized search engines, such as the travel site, 
www.kayak.com, which provides search results 
within a specific subject matter. Moreover, there 
is little or no differentiation between searches 
performed on stationary devices (personal 
computers and laptops) and mobile devices 
(smartphones and tablets).44
–  Comparison shopping market, in which services 
offer searches for specific products or services 
and provide a means to compare products and 
prices directly on the platform without visiting 
a different, specialized website or by providing 
information and links to those sites.45 Compar-
ison shopping services are distinct from: 
(i)  online merchant and merchant platforms, 
such as Amazon and eBay, where consumers 
can actually purchase products, (ii) special-
ized search engines focusing on a single subject 
matter, (iii) online search advertising platforms, 
(iv) various other direct online retailers, and (v) 
offline comparison shopping tools, such as print 
catalog and television advertisements.
41  The markets are held to be national in scope largely for linguistic reasons, cf. Recitals 
251–263.
42  See Recitals 154–263 for an outline of  the two principal markets. For a critical analysis 
of  the segmentation into two separate markets see S. Broos and J. Marcos Ramos, Google, 
Google Shopping and Amazon: The Importance of  Competing Business Models and 
Two-Sided Intermediaries in Defining Relevant Markets (November 27, 2015). The Antitrust 
Bulletin, Vol. 62, Issue 2 (2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2696045.
43  See Recitals 161–190. 
44  Nevertheless, in Recitals 325–330, DG  COMP reverts to the matter, rebutting market 
segmentation that would call into question Google’s position as dominant.
45  Recitals 191–250.
–  Shopping site market, consisting of online 
merchants and merchant platforms that sell 
products and services directly to consumers, 
which may include specialized search engines 
that focus on shopping. Without expressly 
describing it, this market plays a tacit role in 
the decision, because DG  COMP suggested 
that links appearing in Google’s comparison 
shopping service are sourced from the shopping 
site market rather than from an actual search 
across the Internet, and preferentially display 
links to Google’s shopping site.46 Moreover, 
Google frequently alludes to intense compet-
itive pressure on its comparison shopping 
service from players in the shopping site market, 
such as Amazon.47 Thus, both DG COMP and 
Google blur the lines between the market defi-
nitions by referring to the competitive influence 
of the participants in the shopping site market.
16.  There is a connection between the general search 
market and the comparison shopping market,48 
because links to the latter may be provided in reply to 
a search on the former.49 Thus, Google’s general search 
serves as an intermediary between consumers and 
online retailers, merchants, and merchant platforms, 
including Google’s own shopping sites, by providing a 
comparison of available products and services across 
retailers and platforms in response to a general search 
query. By contrast, shopping sites can substitute for 
both general search and specialized search or serve as 
an intermediary to the latter.50 This  holds as long as 
comparison shopping services either undertake an actual 
search across the Internet or utilize information already 
available from specialized (vertical) search engines. 
Regrettably, DG  COMP was silent on this point by 
defining only the first two markets, followed up with the 
conclusion that the general search market is dominated 
by Google, with a market share estimated above 90 
percent in most EU countries.51 Google is present in the 
comparison shopping market with Google Shopping 
(not to be confused with the Shopping Unit), and its 
market position is unknown, although there appears to 
be no less than 361 alternative comparison shopping 
providers.52 By contrast, DG  COMP exerts significant 
effort to explain how Google dominates the general 
46  Recitals 29 and 411.
47  Recitals 235–246 and 590.
48  We leave for elsewhere the debate over whether traditional industrial organization concepts 
such as upstream/downstream and vertical distribution chains meaningfully can be applied 
to the services rendered by Google, as well as the extent to which the standards of  abuse are 
influenced by doing so, since, presumably, such influence is possible.
49  See Recitals 540–541 for a substantive analysis.
50  Recitals 220 and 610c indicate a perception among Google and merchant platforms of  a 
vertical relationship between comparison shopping services and the later.
51  See Recital 282 for an outline of  market shares across member states, and Recital 327 for a 
possible national segregation on mobile devices.
52  See Recital  241 referring to 361 competing comparison shopping services in the EEA 
identified by Google and Recital 370 for the identity of  some of  them. Recital 613 refers 
to 380 such services. It is unclear whether DG COMP accepts the numbers provided, but 
Recital 604 indicates some skepticism about the number. Ce
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search market through strong network and bandwagon 
effects that entrench its near-monopoly position, but 
offers little about comparison shopping sites and other 
specialized search services.53 
17. The upshot is that Google’s dominant market share in 
general search must be evaluated in light of the narrowness 
of the market definition. To Google’s dismay, the agency 
declined to determine market definition by using the 
standard SSNIP-test, which evaluates a proposed 
market definition in terms of purchasers’ willingness 
and ability to switch to products outside the defined 
market when confronted with a “small but significant 
non-transitory increase in price” by a hypothetical 
monopolist. If  products found outside the proposed 
market could serve as economic substitutes, the market 
definition has to be enlarged to include those products.54 
The process is repeated until economic substitutes can no 
longer be found outside the defined market. According 
to DG COMP, the SSNIP-test was unavailable because 
Google does not charge users directly for general search, 
so it was pointless to contemplate consumers’ reaction 
to a hypothetical price increase. Nonetheless, in light of 
negligible or zero switching costs, it is likely indeed that a 
consumer suddenly confronted with a non-zero price for 
using Google search would immediately substitute a free 
alternative search engine. This suggests a broader market 
definition than what was adopted by the Commission. 
This would explain Google’s appetite for using the 
SSNIP-test and DG COMP’s refusal to do so.
18.  Nevertheless, the market definitions relied upon by 
the Commission overcame Google’s objections with a 
number of well-researched and documented references 
cited in the decision, and Google has refrained from 
challenging market definition directly in its arguments 
on appeal.55 However, the issue of the propriety of the 
market definition remains. It is reasonable to conclude 
that general search is something different from specialized 
search, where the former offers results from across the 
entire Internet, while the latter offers only a limited 
set of results within a specific subject matter, such as 
travel or books.56 In the not too distant future, however, 
when general search engines become more proficient at 
eliminating the need for specialized searches, this could 
53  See Recitals 285–315, that also rebuts Google claim of  users utilizing several competing 
search engines, known as multi-homing, and that “Competition Is One Click Away” as often 
articulated by Google. For a critical analysis of  whether Google is dominant, see M. Herz 
(2014). Google Search and the Law on Dominance in the EU: An Assessment of  the 
Compatibility of  Current Methodology with Multi-Sided Platforms in Online Search. 
SSRN, pp. 21–55.
54  See Recitals 242–246. The SNNIP test has found prominence among anti-trust enforcers, 
but remains, as correctly noted by DG  COMP, one among several methods available to 
approximate the cross-price elasticity of  demand for products in a candidate market. 
For reasons why applying the SNNIP test to Internet markets might be too “complex,” 
see M.  A.  Salinger & R.  J. Levinson, Economics and the FTC’s Google Investigation, 
46 Rev. Indus. Org. 25 (2015), pp. 52–53.
55  The appeal in case T-612/17 – Google and Alphabet. O.J. 2017C 369, p. 37, does not specify 
a challenge to the market definitions. In contrast, Google vigorously disputed the market 
definitions in the underlying DG COMP decision, see, e.g., case AT.39.740 – Google Search 
(Shopping), Recitals 235–246.
56  This would be consistent with the evolution of  the search engine, see M.  A.  Salinger 
& R.  J.  Levinson, Economics and the FTC’s Google Investigation, 46 Rev. Indus. Org. 25 
(2015), pp. 32–42.
change, at which point the concept of a Universal Search 
service, as favored by Google, might be the relevant 
product market definition. In any case, because users 
often discover or navigate to specialized search engines by 
finding them in the generic search results, DG COMP’s 
approach to general searches and comparison shopping 
as two, linked markets is plausible.57 
19.  On the other hand, comparison shopping might 
more accurately be characterized as a substitute service 
that competes in the same market as specialized search 
and merchant platforms, because it allows users to 
obtain search results for a specific subject matter.58 
Alternatively, Google’s comparison shopping results 
could be characterized as an improvement on general 
search services, since it contains content from specialized 
search sites and merchant platforms and displays it 
directly next to the generic results.59 Such convergence 
is likely to intensify as the development of the artificial 
intelligence behind search engines evolves through 
succeeding generations.60 Given numerous, equally 
plausible approaches, the appropriate market definition 
for the antitrust analysis may be broader, or different, 
than the market definitions adopted by DG COMP. 
20. More generally, the line between comparison shopping 
services and shopping sites is unclear because they share 
many of the same functions. The decision does not make 
clear, at least from an outside perspective, how DG COMP 
distinguishes between them,61 except, perhaps, that only 
the latter offer direct purchase functionality.62 A further 
question is whether social media such as Facebook differs 
materially from general search when it offers a service 
that has the same characteristics as general search by 
incorporating Bing, Microsoft’s competing general search 
engine.63 Presumably, these questions will be debated when 
the decision is reviewed. Although Google may have more 
or less accepted the maintained market definitions, the 
eventual emergence of a broader set of market definitions 
cannot be ruled out, so it is premature to consider the 
market definition question settled.
57  See Recitals 540–541.
58  This appears to be Google’s position, which regards comparison shopping services 
and merchant platforms to be in the same market, see Case  AT.39.740 – Google Search 
(Shopping), Recitals 227–246 and 590.
59  For a critical analysis of  the markets involved, including the segregation of  search services 
into two separate markets, see S. Broos and J. Marcos Ramos, Google, Google Shopping 
and Amazon: The Importance of  Competing Business Models and Two-Sided Intermediaries 
in Defining Relevant Markets (November 27, 2015). The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 62, Issue 2 
(2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2696045.
60  See, e.g. M. A. Salinger & R. J. Levinson, Economics and the FTC’s Google Investigation, 
46 Rev. Indus. Org. 25 (2015), pp. 32–42.
61  Some of  the ambiguity follows from DG  COMP having found that Google comparison 
shopping services only offer links to Google comparison shopping sites, see, e.g., 
Recitals 411 and 414, making it difficult to distinguish them. Moreover, Google Shopping 
and Google’ Shopping Units, are different but share similar names. DG COMP adds to the 
confusion by using different names for the same functionality within the same context, e.g., 
Product Universal (Recital 408) and Shopping Unit (Recital 412).
62  See Recital 240. But see Recital 241, accepting that some comparison shopping services also 
allow this.
63  See Recital 180. For completes it should be noted that Recital 181 explains how the volume 
of  general searches performed on social network is limited and thus cannot be a direct 
challenge to providers of  general search. Ce
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2.2 The antitrust theory advanced 
by DG COMP
21.  The separate market definitions chosen for the 
analysis are essential to the legal theory advanced in 
the Google Search (Shopping) decision. At its core, the 
violation is monopoly leveraging. The decision maintains 
that dominance in the first (monopolized) general search 
market may be abused by leveraging that strong market 
position into the second (competitive) comparison 
shopping market. The theory depends on the presumption 
that these markets are separate from one another and also 
from the specialized search and shopping site markets. 
Google’s presumed motive is not only to secure control 
of a new and potentially more profitable market, but also 
to prevent operators of comparison shopping sites from 
gaining sufficient commercial momentum to threaten 
Google’s dominance in general search.64 This can occur 
if  comparison shopping services attain a critical mass of 
end users that, with sufficiently strong network effects, 
could create the conditions for a competitive challenge to 
Google’s dominance in general search.
22. The implication is that Google has the incentive to 
foreclose rival comparison shopping site operators from 
attaining too large a share of the comparison shopping 
market. While such a motive is reportedly evidenced 
by internal Google documents, the decision offers little 
explicit discussion of the plausibility of such a market 
threat-and-response. The reasoning makes sense only 
if  one accepts the maintained market definitions and 
that comparison shopping is a separate market. But, at 
the same time, the two markets must be close enough 
in proximity to make a migration by end users from 
one to the other commercially plausible. More fulsome 
references to Google’s internal documents on this 
point,65 or on external economic studies confirming that 
the strategy is likely to have actually governed Google’s 
behavior, would have supported such a conclusion. 
However, the weakness of the decision in this regard is 
legally irrelevant because abuse of dominance does not 
require a showing of malicious intent.66 DG  COMP is 
under no obligation to demonstrate the commercial 
motives for the alleged wrongdoing, although doing 
so unquestionably would have helped to justify and 
rationalize the outcome. 
23.  Although abuse does not require a showing of 
malicious intent, it does require (i) impairment of 
competition, and, (ii) a legal breach of the relevant legal 
standards. Herein lies the second weakness of the EU’s 
Google Search decision. Of the 124 pages of text devoted 
to the question of abuse, most of it is devoted to explaining 
64  See Recitals 641–643.
65  There are references in Recitals 381, 382, 390 and 643 to internal documents that might 
indicate that Google was aware of  the effects of  its conduct, and thus could imply a modicum 
of  wrongful intent, but the issue of  intent was not expressly addressed. See note 37, supra, 
and accompanying text.
66  Cf. case 6/72 – Continental Can, para. 27 and 29; case  T-128/98 – Aéroports de Paris, 
para.  170 and case  C-549/10P – Tomra, para. 19–22, cited in case AT.39.740 – Google 
Search (Shopping), Recital 338.
how Google’s behavior is detrimental to competition—or, 
more accurately, detrimental to Google’s competitors—
while only 11 pages avert to some kind of explanation 
of how the challenged conduct contravenes the relevant 
legal standards.67 As noted earlier, the challenged 
conduct consists of downgrading competing services by 
(i)  submitting rival services only to the generic search 
ranking algorithm, (ii) reserving the best positions in 
the generic search results and the separate boxes for 
Google-affiliated offerings, and (iii) coupling the later 
with pictures and graphics, while presenting competing 
offerings with only text.68 Explaining why this amounts 
to abuse, DG  COMP states: “The Conduct is abusive 
because it constitutes a practice falling outside the scope 
of competition on the merits as it: (i) diverts traffic in the 
sense that it decreases traffic from Google’s general search 
results pages to competing comparison shopping services 
and increases traffic from Google’s general search results 
pages to Google’s own comparison shopping service; and 
(ii) is capable of having, or likely to have, anti-competitive 
effects in the national markets for comparison shopping 
services and general search services.”69
24.  It appears that DG  COMP does not object to the 
application of a self-correcting search algorithm, nor 
directing traffic to Google properties, but only that 
Google’s own offerings are not filtered through the same 
algorithm, so they are allotted more favorable display 
positions and presentations, amounting to discrimination 
by Google in a potentially exclusionary manner. Notably, 
to make out a prima facie case of abuse, DG  COMP 
does not require a showing that specific competitors 
were actually excluded from the market or that a certain 
percentage of the market is foreclosed to them, as long as 
gradual foreclosure is plausible in the longer term.70
25.  The decision may comport with the Commission’s 
theory of abusive leverage, but it does little to account for 
how consumers may be harmed. Comparison shopping 
is clearly a profitable activity, so it is logical that Google 
would attempt to divert traffic to its own sites, a fact that 
does not elude DG COMP,71 which recognizes that in a 
two-sided market losses on one side of the market can be 
recouped on the other.72 The appearance of the Shopping 
Unit inside separate boxes as an innovation that obviates 
the need for a second search for a specialized search 
engine is consistent with this dynamic and presumably 
67  See Recitals 331–339, 591–607 and 641–652.
68  See Recitals 379, 395–397 and 512. However, Recital 2 seems to single out more favorable 
display as abusive in itself  without the other elements.
69  Recital  341. The abusive conduct and its effect are outlined in Recitals 341–396 and 
summarized in Recitals 397–401. Further, notable comments on the review of  the conduct 
are offered in Recitals 336, 537 and 661–662. 
70  Recital  602. See also Recitals 444–451, which outlines the importance of  user traffic to 
competing comparison shopping service and thus why foreclosure might in the long-run 
be a plausible result of  search bias. See also Recitals 539–588, outlining why the lost traffic 
cannot be recouped by other instruments, for example, by acquiring adwords or direct traffic.
71  See, e.g., Recitals 157–160. For completeness it should be noted that general searches might 
not entail an economic loss. Recital 642 indicates that it may be rather profitable.
72  Moreover, as advertisers presumably are sensitive to the accuracy of  search results, any bias 
would have an adverse effect on the markets for advertising mitigating Google’s ability to 
exercise market power. This also applies directly to users and the generic search results. Ce
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beneficial to consumers.73 Google has denied directing 
traffic, but, setting that aside, Google’s behavior might be 
commercially rational and even necessary to develop and 
maintain the superiority of its general search algorithm.74 
Since only one service can be displayed in the box, 
Google’s choice is logical. This places considerable 
stress on the concept of abuse, since the decision implies 
that competing offerings must be displayed no less 
prominently than those who pay to be displayed.75 
26.  Naturally, it is unrealistic to accept that operating 
search engines is unprofitable and implausible that 
Google’s corporate behavior is guided by altruism. Users 
pay for general search in the form of consumer-generated 
data that contributes to the development Google’s 
search algorithm, its digital assets, and other Google 
services, some of which are profitable.76 In this context, 
the essential question is not whether Google diverted 
traffic, but rather whether such diversion constitutes an 
abuse, which DG  COMP has clearly answered in the 
affirmative.77 
2.3 Evaluating the theory of harm 
advanced by DG COMP 
27.  As we noted, it is debatable whether DG  COMP’s 
decision is justified on the basis of the open and novel 
legal standards they appeared to have relied upon. 
Because Google was not found to have denied services, 
Google’s conduct was not a refusal to deal,78 which 
would otherwise have been a logical choice, as it would 
have allowed DG COMP to condemn Google for giving 
its own services a higher rank in search results, even as 
a matter of self-preservation. An ineluctable feature of 
a search engine is that only one link can be first in the 
results. Few would find it entirely unfair to reserve that 
position for one’s own services, unless somehow the 
position amounts to an essential facility, in which case 
there is at least a theoretical basis on which to require 
some form of non-discriminatory access. 
73  See, e.g., Recitals 403–404 for instances in which Google advances the Shopping Unit and 
blended, Universal search results as innovations beneficial to consumers. DG COMP did not 
ignore this argument, but did deny its relevance. See also Recital  652 (the case law does 
not provide for more lenient treatment of  product design improvements); and Recital 343 
(Google did not invent comparison shopping sites).
74  See Recitals 502–510 and case  T-612/17 – Google and Alphabet. O.J.  2017C 369, p.  37, 
plea 1, 2 and 3.
75  Moreover, embedded in DG COMP’s reasoning is that Google is operating not only a two-
sided platform, but also in a two-sided market, which might be less obvious. See G. Luchetta, 
Is the Google platform a two-sided market?, Journal of  Competition Law & Economics, 
Vol. 10, Issue 1, 1 March 2014, pp. 185–207.
76  See Recitals 158–159. Admittedly, such “payments” are more or less voluntary, since end-
users can still access most of  Google’s most popular services even if  they opt-out of  
providing data to the company.
77  It appears that a German court applying the same rules has declined to define this self-
favoritism as abusive, while a UK court, in principle, was inclined to condemn the behavior, 
but found no abuse because the behavior had a legitimate business purpose and had little, 
if any, anticompetitive effect. See District Court of  Hamburg ruling of  4/4-2013 in Verband 
against Google ref: 408 HKO 36/13 and Streetmap v. Google [2016] EWHC 253 at para. 60, 
139, 161,175 and 177.
78  See Recital 650. On the limited ability to advance the case under a theory of  harm based 
on a refusal to supply, see P. Akman, The Theory of  Abuse in Google Search: A Positive and 
Normative Assessment Under EU Competition Law, J. L. Tech. & Policy 2017, pp. 344–355. 
28.  Alternatively, the matter could have been advanced 
as a tying case, in which Google’s search engine is 
alleged to be tied with other Google offerings, such 
as Google Shopping (through the Shopping Unit), 
with rival alternatives demoted in an anticompetitive 
manner.79 Such a tying theory has a factual basis on 
the record and includes a coherent theory of consumer 
harm. In this vein, DG COMP articulates how Google’s 
own comparison shopping services (Google Shopping) 
often utilizes content from, or links to, Google Product 
Shopping, instead of undertaking an actual search, and 
the results are presented as an integrated service by virtue 
of their appearance in the box.80 
29. Neither of these theories—refusal to deal or tying—or 
the anticompetitive harm that flows from them, are relied 
upon expressly by DG  COMP. Moreover, even though 
the description of the offenses sounds in exclusionary 
(vertical) discrimination, those words are never used.81 
Indeed, the decision makes no reference at all to any 
Article  102(c) jurisprudence that would recognize 
discrimination as an abuse. The cases cited interpret the 
general principles of Article 102, not Article 102(c), and 
hold generally that abuse (i) is an open concept based on 
the totality of the circumstances, (ii) can involve more than 
one market, (iii) does not require specific intent, (iv) does 
not require actual foreclosure (potential foreclosure is 
sufficient), and, (v) can be rebutted if  objectively justified 
(although no such rebuttal was raised in the Google case).82 
Of course, case law develops through the inclusion of new 
principles and the standards relating to discrimination 
are particularly underdeveloped. More  importantly, 
however, if  any conduct by a dominant undertaking that 
results in potential foreclosure of competitors is to be 
an abuse, it behooves DG COMP to make clear whether 
it is so by virtue of a breach of an established standard 
or a new one, in which case some additional and more 
compelling evidence of anticompetitive harm should 
certainly be required.
30.  To be sure, voluminous calculations and graphic 
evidence were offered in support of the claim that 
Google’s algorithm is biased in a way that moves traffic 
away from competing comparison shopping sites and 
toward Google’s own properties.83 But these are difficult 
to evaluate from the outside.84 There does appear to be 
79  See, e.g., Recital  420, where DG  COMP notes how the Shopping Unit and Google’s 
standalone shopping websites are presented as a single service or experience, and thus tied. 
For a skeptical view of  the tying theory, see P.  Akman, The Theory of  Abuse in Google 
Search: A Positive and Normative Assessment Under EU Competition Law, J. L. Tech. & 
Policy 2017, pp. 307–327.
80  Recitals 411, 414 and 420.
81  The closest instance of  such a formulation is found in Recital 336, which notes it is abusive 
to “apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties.” For more 
on discrimination as a basis for the alleged abuse, see E. Aguilera Valdivia, The Scope of  
the “Special Responsibility” upon Vertically Integrated Dominant Firms after the Google 
Sopping Case: Is There a Duty to Treat Rivals Equally and Refrain from Favouring Own 
Related Business?, World Competition 41, No. 1 (2018), pp. 43–68. 
82  See Recitals 331–340, 602 and 606.
83  See, e.g., Recitals 361–370, 454–501 and 539–567 for examples of  the statistical and 
graphic analysis used to support DG COMP’s claims. 
84  Google has challenged DG COMP’s calculations and methodology, see Recitals 619–626. Ce
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support for a finding of anticompetitive harm, therefore, 
at least with respect to the propriety of the market 
definitions and the correctness of the inferences drawn 
from the statistical evidence. It is also notable that 
DG COMP found that Google (i) only allows competing 
comparison shopping services to appear as generic search 
results and (ii) applies the ranking quality algorithms 
to rival sites, while Google’s own comparison shopping 
service is prominently positioned, either in separate 
box or above or among the first generic search results, 
supplemented with images, without being subject to being 
demoted by the algorithm.85 It is claimed that Google is 
aware of these effects, including how its own comparison 
shopping service would be significantly demoted if  
subjected to the same ranking quality algorithms and 
the positive effect of the use of images.86 That is, Google 
allegedly is intentionally undertaking these initiatives 
for the purpose of significantly increasing traffic to its 
own Google shopping service. For DG COMP to have 
advanced a theory of harm stemming the discriminatory 
effect of this kind of conduct would have been logical, 
but the Commission chose not to avail itself  of the 
opportunity.87
31. DG COMP customarily confines itself  to standards 
of abuse firmly rooted in practice and theory, moving 
outside of its comfort zone only when necessary in 
cases of clear-cut anticompetitive practices, preferably 
coupled with evident malicious intent. Accordingly, 
doctrinal questions about the legal basis of the Google 
Search decision abound. Conceivably, a finding of 
anticompetitive harm could be supported by the 
evidence adduced, but the presence of malicious intent 
is less obvious.88 More troubling is that the evidence 
of competitive harm seems to be established only by 
appealing to a substantial body of dense statistical 
analysis of the “visibility” and other metrics related to 
the presentation and display of unaffiliated shopping 
sites between 2010 and 2016.89 
32. By declining to link the basis of the decision to well-
defined standards of abuse in the Google Search decision, 
DG COMP has arrogated to itself  overly broad discretion 
to proclaim almost any conduct by an arguably dominant 
undertaking to be an abuse, without having to meet any 
predefined legal requirements or even acknowledge 
awareness of having circumvented established standards. 
This is evident from the reasoning of the decision, which 
is based entirely on allegedly biased search results with 
a supposedly discriminatory effect, but otherwise lacks 
objectivity. But the case was not advanced as such, either 
85  Recitals 344 and 379–396 (application of  the ranking quality algorithms), and 397–401 
(display of  comparison shopping services).
86  Recitals 382–386 and 491.
87  On the limitations of  a discriminatory theory of  harm see P. Akman, The Theory of  Abuse 
in Google Search: A Positive and Normative Assessment Under EU Competition Law, 
J. L. Tech. & Policy 2017, pp. 327–355.
88  See Recitals 381–390 and 643, citing internal documents indicating that Google was aware 
of  the effects of  its conduct, implying an element of  intent. But see note 37, supra, and 
accompanying text.
89  See Recitals 361–370 and 454–501.
because DG  COMP would have had to acknowledge 
that the concept of discriminatory abuse remains as yet 
unsettled and therefore difficult to apply in practice or 
because the search results might not be as discriminatory 
or biased as the complainants had alleged.90 Throughout 
the case, Google had denied any bias in its search 
results, attributing any observed variations in traffic 
and search patterns solely to the technical design and 
implementation of its algorithm. To the extent this 
is true, Google’s behavior in search would seem to fall 
far short of being discriminatory, despite evidence of 
suspicious traffic patterns. If  there is no malicious intent 
or intentional bias, as Google claims, the entire case ends 
up standing for the proposition that any conduct by a 
dominant undertaking is potentially abusive if  (i) harm 
to competition can be shown, (ii) it involves an element 
of self-favoritism and (iii), there is a likelihood of market 
foreclosure in longer run that cannot be rebutted. 
33.  Unfortunately, such a legal rule would widen the 
applicability of Article 102 and arrogate to DG COMP 
overly broad discretion to pursue a wide range of 
conduct in future proceedings, raising the specter of a 
flood of even less well-founded cases in the future. It is 
also problematic if  the Google Search decision means that 
DG COMP and the courts will miss the opportunity to 
develop more clearly defined standards of abuse based 
on discrimination and self-dealing in a case in which the 
facts are well suited for just that purpose.
34.  Finally, the consumer welfare effects are under-
examined and under-explained. Essentially, DG COMP 
has chosen a “consumer choice” standard, by aligning 
consumer welfare with maximizing short-term options 
for alternatives to Google’s offering.91 However, from 
an end-user perspective, the boxes and Universal 
Search are clearly innovations that negate the need for 
additional searches and, thus, likely to be consumer 
welfare-enhancing, undermining DG COMP’s notion of 
consumer harm. 
2.4 The issues on appeal of the EU 
Google Search decision
35.  Clearly, the General Court will have to consider 
numerous issues when it reviews the EU’s Google 
Search decision, not only the analytical weaknesses 
and inconsistencies discussed above but also some 
of the procedural irregularities in the proceedings.92 
For  example, DG  COMP will likely have to defend its 
failure to record a meeting with the complainants in 
the case, in apparent reliance on the now overturned 
90  On the limitations of  applying existing standards of  abuse, see P. Akman, The Theory of  
Abuse in Google Search: A Positive and Normative Assessment Under EU Competition Law, 
J. L. Tech. & Policy 2017, pp. 301–374.
91  For speculation that the consumer choice paradigm may have been considered and rejected 
by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in its earlier investigation of  Google search, see 
note 146, infra, and accompanying text.
92  See Recitals 106–144, outlining the alleged irregularities, including DG  COMP’s failure 
to assess the evidence correctly or to take minutes from a meeting and explain adequately 
its preliminary conclusions, the required remedies, and why it decided to issue fines after 
substantial discussions on a settlement. Ce
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Intel decision, which had suggested that such a lapse 
is immaterial.93 The Intel decision was overturned 
two months after the EU Google Search decision was 
announced. By overturning Intel, the Court of Justice has 
reinforced the obligation to record all such discussions.
36. Equally noteworthy is the fact that the enormous fine 
levied by DG COMP is based on a novel and untested 
legal theory of harm imposed after having attempted on 
several occasions to resolve the matter with behavioral 
commitments alone.94 Furthermore, DG COMP seemed 
to carefully avoid specifying precisely how Google should 
remedy its abuse, confining itself  instead to ordering 
that the conduct be terminated and requiring Google 
to submit evidence of compliance within 90 days of the 
decision or face daily penalties of up to 5% of global 
group turnover.95 Clearly, DG COMP had little appetite 
for setting out how Google should terminate the abuse, 
which is perhaps understandable in light of the many open 
issues remaining in the case.96 Nevertheless, Google has 
been thereby left somewhat in limbo and to some extent 
at the mercy of the complainants, because DG COMP 
is likely to turn to them for assistance in evaluating any 
remedial steps that Google may propose to take. 
37.  This has certain strategic implications. First, in 
our view, the concept of abuse should be reserved for 
situations where alternative conduct is or would have 
been available to the dominant undertaking and can be 
fashioned as an enforcement remedy, at least in broad 
terms. The antitrust laws can give clearer signals to 
business as to what conduct is lawful and what is not. 
Secondly, whether the abuse has been stopped as ordered 
should be objectively verifiable under any remedy 
fashioned by the Commission, otherwise DG COMP will 
have condemned itself  to making an arbitrary assessment 
that would be almost impossible to impartially review. 
38. Lastly, the lack of clarity over how to terminate the 
infringement calls into question exactly what conduct 
DG COMP in its Google Search decision has established 
as abusive conduct, which remains an open question. 
DG  COMP simply states in its opening passages 
that: “[t]he Decision establishes that the more favorable 
positioning and display by Google, in its general search 
results pages, of its own comparison shopping service 
compared to competing comparison shopping services (the 
‘Conduct’) infringes Article 102.” 97 
93  See Recital 120, referring to case T-286/09 – Intel, Recital 619. Overturned by C- 413/14P 
– Intel, Recital 93.
94  For a critical analysis see M. Eben, Fining Google: a missed opportunity for legal certainty? 
European Competition Journal, DOI 10.1080/17441056.2018.1460973 (2018).
95  See Recital 700, summarizing the obligations and P. Akman, The Theory of  Abuse in Google 
Search: A Positive and Normative Assessment Under EU Competition Law, J. L. Tech & Policy 
2017, pp. 365–370 for an analysis of  the challenges of  meeting them.
96  For an analysis of  the remedy, see B. Vesterdorf  and K. Fountoukakos, An Appraisal of  
the Remedy in the Commission’s Google Search (Shopping). Decision and a Guide to its 
Interpretation in Light of  an Analytical Reading of  the Case Law, Journal of  European 
Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2018), pp. 3–18.
97  Recital 2.
39. Thus, reserving a better display position, rather than 
the downgrading the display positions of competing 
offerings, is identified as the abuse. However, the Recitals in 
the decision that outline the effect of downgrading rivals’ 
links suggest that the abuse really arises on account of 
both effects, although the extent the Recitals are intended 
to define the abusive conduct remains unclear.98 It is likely 
that DG COMP will have to defend this ambiguity before 
the General Court, by clarifying precisely the conduct it 
found to be abuse, how the conduct harms consumers, 
and why all of this is sufficiently evident to warrant a 
record fine. 
III. The U.S. Google 
Search decision
40.  In September 2011, the Chairman of the U.S. 
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition 
Policy and Consumer Rights urged the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) to investigate Google for 
misconduct in its search activities.99 A formal investigation 
followed in the first half  of 2012 into whether Google’s 
conduct amounted to a violation of Section  5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, which declares “[u]nfair 
methods of competition (…) and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices (…) unlawful.”100 The investigation focused 
on three concerns: (i) whether Google gave preferential 
placement to its own content while demoting competitors’ 
content, (ii) whether Google used data obtained without 
compensation from third party websites, a practice 
called “scraping,” and, (iii) whether Google imposed 
contractual restrictions on AdWords for the purpose of 
foreclosing its advertisers’ use of other search engines.101 
98  See, e.g., Recitals 342, 344 and 345–377, where the later outlines the demotion. In addition, 
Recital 512 rebuts the notion that the finding of  abuse is limited to better positioning.
99  Letter from Senators Herb Kohl and Mike Lee to Jonathan D. Liebowitz, December 19, 
2011, p. 5.
100  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). Whenever the Commission has reason to believe that such a violation 
has occurred, the agency may bring an administrative complaint to compel the violator 
to cease and desist, with the outcome of  the ensuing administrative trial appealable to a 
U.S. Circuit Court. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). Alternatively, the FTC may commence a civil action 
in a U.S. district court. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m). The substantive scope of  Section 5 is a matter 
of  continuing controversy. A restrictive view maintains that Section  5 is substantively 
coextensive with the boundaries of  Sections  1 and 2 of  the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1,2, and offers only an alternative procedural device by which to enforce the antitrust 
laws. A  more expansive view maintains that Congress would not have enacted Section  5 
unless it intended the statute to cover conduct outside the boundaries of  the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts. By analyzing Google’s conduct mostly under the standards of  Section 2 
of  the  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §  2, however, the Commission largely side-steps that 
controversy. But see Separate Statement of  Comm’r Roach, discussing the implications of  
proceeding under Section 5 of  the FTC Act rather than under the Commission’s authority 
to enforce the Sherman Act.
101  According to FTC Memorandum dated August 8, 2012 on Google Inc, File No. 111-0163, 
p. 102 there appears to have been a fourth concern involving exclusivity around AdSense, 
which was raised in the FTC memorandum, but not in the later press statements. However, 
the Concurring and Dissenting Statement of  Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Regarding 
Google’s Search Practices, In re Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163 January 3, 2012, p. 4, 
suggests that such exclusivity was potentially a misunderstanding of  the facts. Ce
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41.  In January 2013, the FTC terminated its 
investigation102 without filing a complaint against Google 
for alleged search bias, but it did extract from Google 
voluntary commitments to agree for a period of five years 
to allow rival websites to prevent Google from scraping 
and displaying their content and to remove Google’s 
restrictions on the use of its AdWords advertising 
platform, which had the effect of obstructing the ability 
of its advertisers to coordinate online campaigns across 
multiple platforms and search engines.103
42. While the FTC’s decision may have been something of 
a close call, it stands as a unanimous decision by all five 
Commissioners based a fulsome record. The Commission 
concludes that Google’s manner of operating its general 
search service involved neither an unfair method of 
competition nor an unfair or deceptive act or practice. 
In its closing statement, the Commission described 
a comprehensive investigation into the search bias 
allegations and alluded to its review of over nine million 
pages of documents from Google and other parties, 
from interviews with numerous industry participants 
and various consumer and advocacy organizations.104 
The Commission’s staff  also conducted comprehensive 
empirical analyses to evaluate the impact of Google’s 
design changes on search engine traffic and user click-
through behavior. These studies were performed in 
cooperation with the staffs of five state attorneys 
general, each conducting parallel and contemporaneous 
investigations into Google’s search practices. 
43. From a distance, the FTC decision appears to have 
been the result of a consensus of a group of sophisticated 
antitrust enforcement agencies that took account of a 
comprehensive set of analytical considerations to reach 
conclusions supported by the evidence and consistent 
with rigorous economic analysis. But the FTC’s closing 
statement was a mere four pages, so the Commission’s 
reasoning is difficult to analyze in any real depth. 
Former FTC Chairman Bill Kovacic recently called the 
FTC’s failure to release the reasoning behind its closed 
investigation of Google “highly frustrating.”105
44. As it happens, however, an internal FTC memorandum, 
every other page of which was accidentally released 
to the public, provides support for the notion that the 
Commission regarded Google’s conduct as detrimental 
to the interests of consumers and that it tends to 
impede innovation in the online search and advertising 
102  Statement of  the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In 
re Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163 January 3, 2013.
103  The commitments were submitted to FTC in the form of  letter from Google to FCT dated 
December 27, 2012. 
104  Statement of  the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In re 
Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163 January 3, 2013, p. 1.
105  “Kovacic calls for transparency in FTC Google decision,” GCRI (February 22, 
2018), available at: https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1159332/
kovacic-calls-for-transparency-in-ftc-google-decision.
markets.106 The memorandum also described real and 
substantial harm to Google’s competitors. According 
to press reports, there was evidence in the record that 
Google intentionally and deliberately biased its search 
results, in contradiction to the conclusion reached in the 
FTC’s closing statement.107 
1. Overview of the U.S. search 
bias case
45. We do know that the FTC’s investigation was narrowly 
focused on the rankings of the websites displayed in 
general search results, which, as in the EU proceeding but 
using different nomenclature, the Commission recognized 
could be provided by two different kinds of search 
engines.108 “Horizontal,” or general purpose, search 
engines, such as Google, attempt to cover the Internet as 
completely as possible. Specialized, or “vertical,” search 
engines focus on narrowly defined categories of content, 
such as shopping or travel. The Commission recognized 
that, although specialized search engines might appear to 
offer a different kind of service, they also offer consumers 
an alternative means of searching the Internet for specific 
categories of information.109 In particular, once Google 
introduced its Universal service, which displays vertical 
search results in response to a general search query, 
general search began to function as a true alternative to 
specialized searches, thereby further mitigating any real, 
market difference between them. 
46.  The FTC’s search bias investigation evaluated two 
categories of potential misconduct,110 (i) the prominent 
display of Google-affiliated services in a separate box in 
response to a general search query, and, (ii) the design 
or alteration of Google’s search algorithm to demote 
the ranking of certain non-affiliated vertical websites so 
they appear further down the search results page. Thus, 
the FTC had to determine whether changes in Google’s 
search algorithm had the purpose of excluding actual 
or potential competition or instead were intended to 
improve the quality of its search results and the overall 
quality of its users’ experience. After an intense review 
of an apparently substantial evidentiary record, the FTC 
concluded that changes and adjustments in Google’s 
search algorithm were adopted to improve the quality of 
its search results, so to the extent a negative impact on 
actual or potential competitors may have been observed, 
the effect was incidental to a legitimate business purpose. 
“Although at points in time various vertical websites have 
experienced demotions,” the Commission said, “we find 
106  FTC Memorandum dated August 8, 2012 on Google Inc, File No. 111-0163. See 
B. Mullins, R. Winkler and B. Kendall, Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of  Google, Wall 
Street Journal March 19, 2015 for further on the process that led to the release on the FTC 
document.
107  See B. Mullins, R. Winkler and B. Kendall, Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of  Google, Wall 
Street Journal March 19, 2015.
108  Statement of  the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices In the 
Matter of  Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163 January 3, 2013, p. 1.
109  Id.
110  Id. at 2. Ce
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that this was a consequence of algorithm changes that also 
could plausibly be viewed as an improvement in the overall 
quality of Google’s search results.”111
47. In essence, the FTC concluded that the loss of traffic 
by some of Google’s rivals was not the byproduct of 
anticompetitive conduct but the outcome of “competition 
on the merits,” so Google’s behavior was not amenable to 
condemnation by the antitrust laws. Moreover, Google 
also voluntarily committed to allow providers of websites 
to opt out of certain of Google’s search offerings without 
being removed completely and to remove restrictions on 
the use of its online advertising platform. 
2. The merits of the U.S. search 
bias case and its outcome
48.  The closing statement clearly reflects an abiding 
conviction that the evidence in the record suggested that 
the demotion of the links of Google’s rivals, who may have 
lost sales as a result, was an unintentional consequence of 
the improvement of Google’s algorithm and its general 
search product. Moreover, Google introduced evidence 
that it had tested the effect of its Universal search 
feature before launching it and was apparently willing to 
tolerate the demotion of some of its own content to less 
prominent positions in the general search results when 
a higher ranking would have adversely affected the user 
experience. The FTC’s decision, therefore, seemed to rest 
upon three related elements: (i) that Google might have 
disadvantaged its rivals and harmed competition, but, 
(ii) it was an unintentional consequence of a genuine desire 
to enhance their consumers’ experiences, and, (iii)  there 
was no apparent bias or self-favoritism, as Google’s own 
services were also subject to demotions in rank. 
49.  Admittedly, the Commission’s published closing 
statement states no such concise explication of the basis 
of its decision, but on closer inspection of the internal 
memorandum (or, at least what is available of it) offer a 
more complicated story.
50.  The memorandum shows that the staff  regarded 
scraping and the use of exclusionary arrangements as 
potential violations of the anti-monopolization provision 
in Section 2 of the Sherman Act, but it did not view the 
allegations of search bias in the same light.112 This was in 
spite of evidence that Google engaged in self-favoritism 
and deliberately biased search results and that Google’s 
Universal search services benefitted competitively from 
exclusive rights to certain images, from failing to disclose 
Google affiliations, from excusing itself  from the usual 
“click-through rate” ranking criteria, and from better 
positioning its services in the generic search results.113 
Demoting rival sites, moreover, even may have involved 
111  Id. at 4.
112  FTC Memorandum dated August 8, 2012 on Google Inc, File No. 111-0163, at 86, 94, 
102 and 112.
113  Id. at 24–26
the sacrifice of short-term profits,114 because it depressed 
revenue from paid advertising.115 Between July 2007 and 
July 2008, self-favoritism by Google in that time elevated 
Google’s specialized Google Product Search from a page 
rank of seventh to number one, at the expense, of course, 
of competing services.116
51.  None of this, however, was apparently enough to 
support the bringing of a case against Google for allegedly 
biased and self-serving search results. The incompleteness 
of the leaked memorandum is particularly unfortunate in 
that it deprives us of a full understanding of the FTC’s 
assessment of Google’s self-favoritism. It is clear that 
the FTC viewed Google in 2012 as dominant in general 
search, with a 71% market share. But it is deeply engrained 
in U.S. monopolization law that the mere possession of 
monopoly power is not unlawful unless it is accompanied 
by an element of anticompetitive conduct.117 In contrast 
to the EU and many other jurisdictions that recognize an 
offense of abuse of monopoly, current U.S. law does not 
consider it unlawful to “exploit” a monopoly, so long as 
the monopoly in question has not been gained, or is not 
being maintained or expanded, in an unlawful way. 
52.  The staff  clearly had mixed feelings about moving 
forward on Section 2 monopolization grounds and even 
compiled a compendium of perceived litigation risks, 
including questions about whether Google’s monopoly 
power was durable (“an increasing number of websites 
(e.g., Facebook, Twitter) compet[e] for user time and 
advertiser dollars”), whether Universal search was a 
“product improvement” that benefitted consumers, 
and whether there really lacked sufficient competitive 
choice in the advertising market (“[t]he largest advertisers 
(…) already advertise on both [Google’s] AdWords and 
[Microsoft’s] AdCenter”).118 
3. Could the FTC have prevailed 
in a case against Google search 
based on the record evidence 
adduced in the EU case?
53.  Had the Commission chosen instead to proceed 
against Google search, might they have prevailed in court, 
given the evidence developed in the EU proceeding? 
114  The so-called “profit sacrifice test” as indicative of  exclusionary conduct is based on the 
substantive economic notion that firms will not pursue strategies that involve a short-
run loss unless they view those losses as an investment in future profitability. See, e.g., 
A.  D.  Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct—Are 
There Unifying Principles? 73 Antitrust L.J. 375, 389–90 (2006). For reasons why such a 
test may be inapplicable to the Google search case, see, e.g., J. M. Jacobson and S. A. Sher, 
“No Economic Sense” Makes No Sense for Exclusive Dealing, 73 Antitrust L.J. 779 (2006).
115  It should be noted that Google did not charge merchants for the privilege of  being listed in 
the Universal search services when the FTC issued its decision.
116  FTC Memorandum dated August 8, 2012 on Google Inc, File No. 111-0163, p. 30.
117  Verizon Commc’ns. v. Law Offices of  Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004); see also 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–571 (1966) and United States v. Int’l 
Harvester, 274 U.S. 693, 753-54 (1927) (same). 
118  FTC Memorandum dated August 8, 2012 on Google Inc, File No. 111-0163, pp. 84–86 
and 114. Ce
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Recall that the EU’s Google Search decision rested upon 
four principal conclusions:
–  First, comparison shopping services, and other 
sources that feed into the box are separate 
products, and thus specialized search and 
general search occupy different defined markets. 
The EU did not consider the Universal feature 
to be an improvement to general search, as did 
the FTC, and even if  it had, EU doctrine does 
not provide for more favorable assessment of 
such innovations when they lead to potential 
foreclosure in adjacent markets.119
–  Second, self-favoritism in the form of better 
positioning in the generic search results, exclu-
sive display in the box, and the evaluation of 
Google’s own links under a different, more 
lenient quality ranking algorithm, is abusive, 
if  doing so impedes competitors and their 
position in the market.
–  Third, DG COMP is not required to prove that 
the self-favoritism has the actual effect of fore-
closing specific competitors, nor that a certain 
percentage of the market has been foreclosed. 
It is sufficient if  foreclosure might occur in the 
long-run.120 Moreover, the absolute number of 
remaining active rival comparison shopping 
services is not probative of whether abuse has 
occurred, as the number and economic strength 
of market rivals might have been higher but for 
the self-favoritism; and,
–  Fourth, although it is possible for a dominant 
undertaking to defend its behavior as either 
objectively necessary or counterbalanced by 
efficiency gains that also benefit consumers, this 
was not found to apply in this case.121
54.  Aside from the somewhat different views of 
market definition held by the two agencies, the cases 
are practically identical with respect to the conduct 
complained of. The differences in the names of the 
services involved in the DG COMP and the FTC cases, 
e.g., Universal Search, Product Universal, the “box,” and 
Shopping Units, are trivial, because they all refer to the 
same specialized information about Google products and 
services provided automatically in response to a general 
search inquiry in a box appearing next to or above the 
generic search results. Even the alleged bias appears 
identical in the two cases, involving (i) reserving the 
boxes for Google offerings and (ii) applying the ranking 
algorithm solely to competing offerings, although only 
DG COMP viewed this as part of a deliberate strategy 
of foreclosure, rejecting the notion that the boxes were an 
innovate improvement to general search.
119  Case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recital 652.
120  Case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recitals 602–603.
121  Case AT.39.740 – Google Search (Shopping), Recitals 340 and 653–671.
55.  Tempting as it may be to attribute the different 
outcomes in the two jurisdictions to the disparate views of 
the relevant markets and the EU’s rejection of the boxes as 
a product improvement, those explanations for the FTC 
having closed its investigation are probably incomplete. 
For one thing, at points the Commission seemed to 
accept separate market definitions for vertical specialized 
search engines and general search,122 although it made 
no direct finding to that effect.123 Yet,  paradoxically, 
the Commission also seemed to regard Universal search 
services as an improvement to general search results. 
In any case, the staff  ultimately regarded Google’s self-
favoritism as non-cognizable under existing Section  2 
jurisprudence, while the EU adjudged the same conduct 
as a violation of Article 102.
56. The question facing the Commission, however, was 
not only whether Google’s conduct violated Section  2, 
but also whether the company violated Section 5 of the 
FTC Act.124 As a technical matter, the FTC’s statutory 
authority to challenge anticompetitive conduct is always 
based on Section  5. Aside from Section  5, the agency 
has no independent legal authority to bring cases for 
violations of the antitrust laws, including the Sherman 
Act. To be sure, an overwhelming majority of cases 
against “unfair methods of competition” are alleged and 
pleaded as violations of the Sherman or Clayton Acts, 
but in such cases the Commission invokes its Section 5 
authority and incorporates Sherman or Clayton Act law 
and principles by reference.
57. Thus, the question of whether the Commission should 
or could have brought a case to court based on Google 
search bias involves really two questions: i) whether 
the FTC could or should have brought a Sherman Act, 
Section  2 case (under its Section  5 authority), and ii) 
whether it could or should have brought a free-standing 
or independent Section 5 claim.
3.1 The prospective Section 2 case
58. The Commission’s staff  in its memorandum clearly 
considered itself  constrained by current Section  2 case 
law, which is generally unreceptive to condemning bare 
self-favoritism. At the same time, the pro-competitive 
justifications presented by Google appeared plausible 
and persuasive. Although much of the staff’s reasoning 
can be assumed to appear on the missing pages, there is 
enough material available to indicate that the Commission 
122  FTC Memorandum dated August 8, 2012 on Google Inc, File No. 111-0163, pp. 64–74.
123  The issue is discussed by Richard J. Gilbert, U.S. Federal Trade Commission Investigation 
of  Google Search (2013), in The Antitrust Revolution (J. E. Kwoka, Jr. & L. J. White eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 7th ed. forthcoming), pp. 9–10 (“A necessary condition for an alleged 
vertical service to be a separate market is sufficient differentiation from general purpose search 
engines. It is unclear whether online comparison shopping services such as Nextag or Shopzilla 
are sufficiently differentiated from general-purpose search engines to meet this condition, 
particularly with the evolution of  Universal Search displays that blur the distinction between 
general-purpose search results and specialized vertical services”). Moreover, the FTC’s closing 
statement also refers to specialized (vertical) searches as separate from general (horizontal) 
searches. Statement of  the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices 
In the Matter of  Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163 January 3, 2013, p. 1
124  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of  competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful”). Ce
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accepted the genuineness of the desire by Google to 
continuously innovate and produce high quality search 
results, albeit blended with a desire to direct users to its 
own services to increase its own revenue. 
59.  These blended effects led the staff  to trace the 
weakness of a prospective Section 2 case against Google 
for search bias to the need for balancing, in which the 
pro-competitive effects of Universal search as a product 
improvement with substantial benefits to its users would 
have to be weighed against the anticompetitive effect 
the conduct appeared to inflict on the vertical search 
market. “The evidence,” the memorandum stated: “paints 
a complex portrait of a company working toward an overall 
goal of maintaining its market share by providing the best 
user experience, while simultaneously engaging in tactics 
that resulted in harm to many vertical competitors, and 
likely helped to entrench Google’s monopoly power over 
search and search advertising.”125 
60.  Given that these countervailing factors would need 
“extensive balancing, a task,” the staff  noted, “that 
courts have been unwilling—in similar circumstances—to 
perform under Section 2,” the ultimate conclusion was a 
recommendation against moving forward with an action 
based on the search bias allegations.126
61.  Although the prospect of having to perform such 
balancing may have been unappealing, the decision not 
to proceed against Google search probably did not turn 
on any serious doctrinal objections on the part of the 
FTC’s staff  to balancing anticompetitive effects against 
claimed efficiencies, which has long been a feature of 
Section  2 jurisprudence, or on the view that courts are 
loath to engage in such an analysis. It is more plausible 
that the decision was driven by the specter of having to 
balance the specific anti- and pro-competitive effects 
raised in the case in the context of a new and perhaps 
not-fully-understood digital industrial environment. 
62.  Some concept of balancing has marked U.S. 
Section 2 jurisprudence since at least the 1911 Standard 
Oil decision, which adopted the rule of reason to Section 
2 cases.127 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the same 
approach in Lorain Journal v. United States128 and Aspen 
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp,129 while, 
more recently, the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft described in 
detail precisely how such balancing is to be performed 
when it becomes necessary to determine the line between 
“vigorous competition” on the one hand and “illicit 
exclusion” on the other.130 
125  FTC Memorandum dated August 8, 2012 on Google Inc, File No. 111-0163, p. 86.
126  Id. 
127  Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
128  342 U.S. 143 (1951).
129  472 U.S. 585 (1985).
130  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
63. The Microsoft court adopted a structured approach 
to Section 2 litigation that involves a series of burden-
shifting steps, beginning with a demonstration by the 
plaintiff  that the monopolist’s conduct has the requisite 
anticompetitive effect to make out a prima facie case. 
After such a showing, the plaintiff  wins, unless the 
defendant asserts a procompetitive justification, i.e., 
“a non-pretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of 
competition on the merits because it involves, for example, 
greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal.”131 In that 
case, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff  to rebut the 
procompetitive justification by rebutting, for example, 
that there are cost savings, efficiencies, or enhancements 
that benefit consumers. In the event that the plaintiff  is 
unable to entirely rebut the procompetitive assertion, 
so there is a residual anticompetitive effect with some 
modicum of enhanced consumer appeal or increased 
efficiency, the plaintiff  may still win, if  it “demonstrate[s] 
that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the 
procompetitive benefit.”132
64.  In practice, however, the judicial exercise in 
which anticompetitive effects are weighed against 
procompetitive effects remains controversial. There is 
even some doubt over whether such a procedure can be 
found in nature. “Indeed,” Professor Gavil writes, “despite 
nearly a century of devotion to the ‘balancing’ concept, in 
fact there is a remarkable dearth of examples of courts 
actually engaging in any kind of balancing.”133 Litigated 
cases in which a court has had to balance whether there 
is sufficient evidence of anticompetitive effect against 
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 
business efficiencies claimed by the defendant are rare. 
More typically, once a court has accepted the plaintiff ’s 
prima facie case, the defendant’s claimed efficiencies are 
usually either accepted, in which case the defendant wins, 
or they are found to be pretextual and invalid, in which 
case the plaintiff  wins. 
65. Other criticisms of the balancing approach are that it 
fails to provide sufficient guidance as to what constitutes 
lawful business conduct, or that it is inherently 
asymmetrical in favor of the plaintiff, because it pits 
merely theoretical anticompetitive effects against what 
must be proven as efficiencies, or, alternatively, in favor of 
defendants, because the evidence of efficiencies is solely 
in the possession of the defendants. Nonetheless, three 
FTC Commissioners in 2008 expressly supported the 
Microsoft approach as a general test for monopolizing 
conduct.134 
131  253 F.3d at 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
132  Id.
133  A. I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better 
Balance, 72 Antitrust L.J. No. 1 (2004), p. 73. 
134  Statement of  FTC Commissioners Harbor, Liebowitz, and Rosch on the Issuance of  the 
Section 2 Report by the Department of  Justice 1 (Sept. 8, 2008); see also 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, § 10 (expressly adopting structured approach to Clayton Act Section 7 
merger cases). Ce
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66.  Moreover, such balancing frequently features 
prominently in the evaluations of proposed mergers 
that are routinely undertaken by the FTC, the Antitrust 
Division, and, if  a complaint is filed, the courts. In the 
2010 FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the U.S. 
agencies appeared to adopt a “sliding scale” approach to 
balancing (at least in the context of merger control) under 
which cognizable efficiencies that have been verified and 
do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output 
or service potentially may reverse or reduce a merger’s 
anticompetitive harm. But the 2010 Guidelines seem to 
balance such efficiencies against anticompetitive harm 
on a sliding scale, stating: “In conducting this analysis, 
the Agencies will not simply compare the magnitude of 
the cognizable efficiencies with the magnitude of the likely 
harm to competition absent the efficiencies. The greater 
the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the 
greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more 
they must be passed through to customers, for the Agencies 
to conclude that the merger will not have an anticompetitive 
effect in the relevant market. When the potential adverse 
competitive effect of a merger is likely to be particularly 
substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies 
would be necessary to prevent the merger from being 
anticompetitive.”135 
67.  Some observers maintain that the approach 
to balancing anti- and pro-competitive effects in 
the Guidelines requires the parties to overcome a 
greater burden of proof on efficiencies than does 
the Commission in satisfying its prima facie burden 
of establishing anticompetitive effects. For example, 
former Commissioner Joshua D. Wright’s dissent to the 
FTC’s 2014 decision to issue a Complaint against the 
Ardagh Group’s proposed acquisition of Saint-Gobain 
Containers Inc. and Compagnie de Saint-Gobain voiced 
concern that the Commission had created a burden of 
proof for efficiencies that was disproportionately high 
in comparison to the Commission’s initial burden.136 
But, even so, Commissioner Wright did not hesitate to 
weigh in with his own assessment of the anticompetitive 
effects of the proposed merger (“I am persuaded that 
the proposed transaction is likely to generate, at best, 
small unilateral price effects”137) against his evaluation 
of the parties’ claimed efficiencies (“My own analysis 
of cognizable efficiencies in this matter indicates they are 
significant”138).
68.  It is unlikely, therefore, that the Commission did 
not attempt to prove a Section  2 violation against 
Google search because the balancing procedure itself  is 
inherently objectionable or disfavored by the courts, as 
the staff  suggested in its memorandum. It is more likely 
that the procedure as applied to the particular facts of 
the case—weighing the loss of vertical search providers 
135  FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), at 31.
136  Dissenting Statement of  Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In the Matter of  Ardagh Group 
S.A., and Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc., and Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, FTC File 
No. 131-0087 (April 11, 2014).
137  Id. at 2.
138  Id. at 5.
against the appearance of the arguably efficient and 
useful boxes in Google’s general search results—would 
be simply too arbitrary, standard-less, or intractable to 
justify the attempt to secure a favorable judicial decision. 
In contrast to the ambiguity of whether general and 
specialized search are separate markets, which may 
have been a weakness deterring the Commission from 
attempting to prove up a Section 2 case, the staff  may have 
anticipated that the need to eventually reckon between 
the exclusion of vertical search rivals on the one hand 
and Google’s efficiency arguments on the other would 
bedevil any court confronted with a Section 2 complaint. 
3.2 The prospective Section 5 case 
69. Congress enacted the FTC Act in 1914 (two weeks 
before it passed the Clayton Act) to upgrade the U.S. 
system of competition law that had been in place since 
1890, in part by endowing the FTC with Section  5 
authority to reach conduct not necessarily proscribed 
by the other U.S. competition statutes.139 In a “pure” or 
“standalone” Section 5 case, the Commission challenges 
conduct beyond the Sherman Act’s limits under the 
theory that that conduct, whether or not it constitutes 
a violation of the Sherman Act, constitutes an “unfair 
method of competition.” Could the Commission have 
mounted a successful standalone case under Section 5? 
Or, put differently, did Google’s conduct involve the 
kind of behavior that lies outside the boundaries of the 
Sherman Act but nonetheless deserved condemnation 
under the unfairness doctrine? 
70.  The answer depends critically on the standards 
applicable to Section 5. Some commentators from 
the business community assume that, by definition, a 
standalone Section 5 action departs from the consumer 
welfare standard and the essential public policy behind 
the U.S. antitrust laws in favor of a rudderless, ad hoc 
characterization of conduct that is somehow “unfair.”140 
Under such a view, the complainants are likely to 
consider Google’s unfairness to be self-evident, even if  it 
means a preordained outcome against Google based on 
little more than governmental fiat.
71.  But, such Section  5 jeremiads, in our view, go too 
far, and the conception of Section  5 as necessarily a 
rudderless ship ignores both the Commission’s historical 
reluctance to invoke its standalone Section 5 authority as 
well as the set of clearly stated principles released by the 
FTC on August 13, 2015, which lists the Commission’s 
139  W. E. Kovacic & M. Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of  Section 5 of  
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 Antitrust L.J. No. 3 (2010). The authors cite FTC 
v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968), in which the oil company, Texaco, had entered into 
commission arrangements with manufacturers of  tires, batteries, and accessories, and 
then pressured its Texaco-branded dealers to sell those manufacturers’ products. Finding 
that Texaco “holds dominant economic power over its dealers,” the Supreme Court affirmed 
the FTC’s decision to use Section 5 to condemn Texaco’s conduct. Id. at 231; see also FTC 
v.  Sperry & Hutchinson Trading Stamp Co., 405 U.S.  233 (1972) (Commission could use 
its Section 5 authority to reach practices outside the letter and spirit of  the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts under the so-called “unfairness doctrine.”)
140  See, e.g., G. Manne and B. Szoka, Section 5 of  the FTC Act and monopolization cases: 
A brief  primer, in Truth on the Market, available at: https://laweconcenter.org/resource/
section-5-of-the-ftc-act-and-monopolization-cases-a-brief-primer. Ce
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desiderata for standalone enforcement of Section  5.141 
In its statement of principles, the Commission described 
three conditions for the Commission to challenge an 
act or practice as an unfair method of competition on a 
standalone basis. 
72. First, the Commission will be guided by the public 
policy underlying the antitrust laws, namely, the 
promotion of consumer welfare, according to which a pure 
Section 5 case would not necessarily require abandoning 
the consumer welfare standard.142 This principle largely 
dispenses with the notion that such cases will inevitably 
be decided on the basis of ad hoc or subjective notions of 
“unfairness,” by tethering Section 5 tightly to the welfare 
analysis at the heart of the present-day Sherman Act. 
73.  The second FTC Section  5 enforcement principle 
requires that “the act or practice challenged by the 
Commission must cause, or be likely to cause, harm 
to competition or the competitive process, taking into 
account any associated cognizable efficiencies and business 
justifications.”143
74. The third and final Section 5 enforcement principle 
is that “the Commission is less likely to challenge an 
act or practice as an unfair method of competition on a 
standalone basis if enforcement of the Sherman or Clayton 
Act is sufficient to address the competitive harm arising 
from the act or practice.” Thus, pure Section 5 authority 
should only be invoked against conduct beyond the reach 
of the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
75.  Depending on how the FTC goes about applying 
them, such principles can constrain the territory 
beyond the Sherman and Clayton Acts that can be 
occupied by Section  5. By adopting a similar set of 
enforcement norms in the Google search bias case, the 
Commission’s staff  may have perceived the same kinds 
of difficulties with proceeding solely under Section 5 as 
with pursuing a case under Section 2. For example, the 
second principle to account for “cognizable efficiencies 
and business justifications” would have led to the same 
kind of balancing exercise the staff  was eager to avoid in 
a Section 2 case.144 Similarly, the second principle could 
require the Commission to particularize precisely how 
Google’s conduct interferes with the competitive process, 
a task made difficult by the fact that the “but for” or 
“undistorted” competitive process that would have taken 
place in the absence of the challenged conduct is far from 
obvious. 
141  U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Statement of  Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair 
Methods of  Competition” Under Section 5 of  the FTC Act, August 13, 2015.
142  Id.
143  Supra note 141.
144  Section  5(n) of  the FTC Act in 1994 also limits the Commission’s authority to bring 
Section 5 enforcement actions “unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
76.  But a strict focus on consumer welfare—and all 
the baggage accumulated in U.S. antitrust cases that 
implement the consumer welfare standard—may have 
been the FTC’s real stumbling block in a pure Section 5 
proceeding against Google. If  so, it would explain a great 
deal of the difference between the law applied by the FTC 
in the U.S. and DG COMP in the EU and largely account 
for the dramatically different outcomes.
77. The precise wording of the first principle is that “the 
Commission will be guided by the public policy underlying 
the antitrust laws, namely, the promotion of consumer 
welfare.” The implementation of the consumer welfare 
standard in U.S. antitrust has come to require assessment 
of productive, allocative, and dynamic efficiencies. In the 
context of the Google search bias case, the burden of 
showing a net reduction in consumer welfare could be 
impossible to satisfy. Google would certainly have been 
able to show an increase in output during the period 
of the supposed violation and the FTC would be hard 
pressed to demonstrate an increase in prices.145 Moreover, 
the Commission’s apparent concession that Google’s 
boxes represent a beneficial innovation would favor 
Google in a court’s assessment of dynamic efficiency. 
In short, if  the Commission interpreted the public policy 
underlying Section 5 to be to promote consumer welfare, 
then proof of negative welfare effects according to the 
standards applied by the courts in traditional Sherman 
Act cases would also be required in a pure Section 5 case, 
a significantly better litigation option than proceeding 
with a monopolization claim under Section 2.
78. A pure Section 5 case against Google search becomes 
more feasible as the interpretation the policy to promote 
consumer welfare is broadened to encompass theories 
of anticompetitive harm evidenced by something other 
than standard antitrust welfare economics. A broader 
concept of harm to consumers would admit evidence, for 
example, of conduct that creates an obstacle or retardant 
to the competitive process or disrupts the normal pace 
or flow of commerce.146 The underlying assumption of 
such an approach is that consumers gain from the process 
of market competition, so that acts or practices that 
interfere with the process necessarily deprive consumers 
of those benefits. In a similar vein, the consumer choice 
approach focuses on actual or potential choice in the 
marketplace and the key factors necessary for markets to 
function competitively.147 
79. At the same time, the farther from traditional welfare 
analysis the Commission strays in its application of its 
standalone Section 5 authority, the less likely its case will 
145  It may have been possible to demonstrate a price effect on the advertising side of  Google’s 
search platform, but the inquiry did not extend to those markets.
146  See, e.g., E. M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and 
Anticompetitive Effect, 70 Antitrust L.J. No.  2 (2002), pp. 371–372 (describing “the 
analysis of  mergers and dominant firm conduct that may be exclusionary but do not 
necessarily change the shapes of  the triangles and rectangles, at least not in knowable ways,” 
in which “[t]he analyst looks at the market structure and dynamics, and asks whether the 
practice interferes with and degrades the market mechanism”). 
147  See, e.g., R. H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of  Antitrust, 62 U. Pitt. 
L. Rev. No. 3 (2001), pp. 503–525. Ce
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ultimately succeed. As one of us cautioned in 2012, an 
unbounded Section  5 case against Google search will 
never be sustained by a reviewing court. To the contrary, 
“the only way a court will allow the FTC to pursue a pure 
Section  5 theory against Google would be if the agency 
constrains itself with a coherent principle of competitive 
harm (…).”148 
80.  The consumer choice framework would have been 
feasible for the Commission because it addresses 
non-price issues that consumers care about, such as 
variety, quality, privacy, and innovation, but at the same 
time it is constrained by limiting principles. For example, 
only conduct that significantly and materially impairs 
consumer choice, or significantly distorts consumers’ 
ability freely to choose among the alternatives the 
market provides, would count. Thus, not every decrease 
in choice would qualify as an injury to competition. 
More choice is not always necessarily good, because too 
much choice can lead to consumer confusion and higher 
search or transaction costs. The purpose of the consumer 
choice standard is to eliminate practices that artificially 
restrict the choices the free market would have otherwise 
provided. “[E]very antitrust violation reduces consumer 
choice, but not every reduction in consumer choice is an 
antitrust violation,”149 so a better label for the framework 
might be the “optimal consumer choice” standard. 
81.  Although such an approach is likely to be resisted 
in some quarters of the U.S. antitrust establishment,150 
it fits squarely into the “ordoliberal school” supposedly 
governing EU competition law and apparently at play 
in DG  COMP’s Google Search (Shopping) decision.151 
To  reach the result it did, DG  COMP must have been 
guided to some extent by the notion of intervening 
against anticompetitive conduct so as to maintain the 
competitive process and protect the emergence of market 
outcomes unmolested by a dominant market participant. 
These same indicia of anticompetitive conduct are 
endorsed, within limitations, by the consumer choice 
framework. If, at the time of the investigation into 
Google search the consensus of the FTC staff  was that 
the consumer choice framework departed too widely 
from an underlying policy to promote consumer welfare, 
many of the same obstacles to bringing a Sherman Act 
case also would have disqualified a pure Section 5 case.
148  R. H. Lande & J. L. Rubin, How the FTC Could Beat Google, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, (1) 
October 2012, at *2 (recommending the consumer choice framework as the standard to be 
applied in a pure Section 5 case against Google search).
149  Id. at *3.
150  See, e.g., J. D. Wright & D. H. Ginsburg, The Goals of  Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 
81 Ford. L. Rev. (2013), p. 2406.
151  P.  Behrens, The Ordoliberal Concept of  ‘Abuse’ of  a Dominant Position and its Impact 
on Article  102 TFEU (September 9, 2015) in Nihoul/Takahashi, Abuse Regulation 
in Competition Law, Proceedings of  the 10th ASCOLA Conference, Tokyo (2015), 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2658045, at *24 (“Ordoliberals have always 
appreciated and highlighted the positive welfare effects of  competition in terms of  productive, 
allocative and dynamic efficiencies. What they refuse, however, is to measure the allocative 
and dynamic efficiency effects of  individual business strategies. The determination and 
materialization of  these effects depends on consumers’ choice in the market [which] can 
only be the result of  effective competition. These results cannot be specified ex ante, because 
that would require access to the full amount of  information which competition is supposed to 
discover in the first place”).
82.  But the Commission’s Statement of Enforcement 
Principles regarding the unfair competition prong of 
Section  5 codifying the policy of promoting consumer 
welfare was issued a full three years after the FTC’s Google 
search non-prosecution decision. Thus, the Commission’s 
staff might very well have examined the case through the 
lens of the consumer choice framework and still decided 
that Google’s conduct neither significantly restricted the 
choices available to consumers nor significantly distorted 
consumers’ ability freely to choose among the alternatives 
the market provided. However, as long as both agencies 
continue to obscure the precise legal standards on which 
their decisions rest, it will remain unclear whether the 
different outcomes are attributable to the application of 
different legal standards defining anticompetitive conduct 
or to similar standards that have been differently applied. 
83. Nonetheless, even under a consumer choice framework, 
it may have been difficult for the Commission to have 
attempted to proceed to court with a pure Section 5 case 
without the ability to quantify in some meaningful way 
how consumers actually using these services have been 
constrained by the appearance of boxes in search results 
or disadvantaged by the disappearance or weakening of 
a number of specialized search engine websites. Thus, any 
Section 5 case might have presented challenges that the 
Commission may have considered at the time to be, if  not 
overwhelming, at least overly risky. 
IV. Conclusion 
84. Despite the focus of both the FTC and DG COMP 
on self-favoritism in which only Google-affiliated services 
are displayed in the side boxes and specialized and general 
searches are blended, the FTC declined to prosecute, 
while DG COMP viewed this as anticompetitive conduct 
in defiance of the special responsibility of dominant 
undertakings. DG  COMP’s Google Search decision has 
engendered considerable debate, because neither the 
U-turn from a non-monetary settlement to the biggest 
fine in Commission history nor the grounds for the 
market definitions nor the theory of anticompetitive 
harm are fully explained. But the FTC’s earlier closing 
statement to explain its decision not to proceed was 
similarly uninformative. The Commission’s closing 
statement alluded to the competitive issues in a general 
way but failed to specify whether the legal standard 
applied to Google’s conduct in its consideration of a pure 
Section 5 claim departed in any meaningful way from the 
customary standards of Section  2 and, if  so, whether 
Google’s conduct failed to amount to a violation even 
under such a wider set of anticompetitive indicia. It is not 
evident, in other words, that the FTC was compelled to 
close its case without identifying an antitrust violation, 
particularly in light of the description of anticompetitive 
behavior in the leaked memorandum.
85. The similarities between the two cases are considerable. 
The market definitions utilized by DG  COMP echo 
many of the same concerns voiced by the FTC, so it is 
conceivable that the FTC could have drawn a sharper Ce
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boundary between specialized and general search, 
where the latter is dominated by Google. Similarly, the 
FTC’s apparent acceptance of comparison shopping 
as an improvement to general search rather than as a 
separate market could have been an artifact of a less 
comprehensive study of the relevant data or the relatively 
broader scope of the FTC’s investigation. The FTC had 
investigated multiple examples of self-favoritism and 
alleged search bias, whereas DG COMP confined itself  
to comparison shopping services, potentially making 
the risk of foreclosure and harm to consumer choice 
easier to demonstrate. In slightly different circumstances, 
therefore, the FTC might have ended up with market 
definitions substantively identical to DG COMP.
86.  We attribute the difference in the two outcomes 
despite these similarities to three principal factors 
working in conjunction. First and foremost, DG COMP 
did not appear to consider itself  particularly constrained 
by established case law or the existing legal standards 
of single-firm abuse. Confronted with a form of self-
favoritism by Google that affected competition, 
DG  COMP appeared to decide to expand the concept 
of abuse, presumably after concluding that the behavior 
would have eluded other theories, such as discrimination. 
This maneuver imparts a sense of regulatory shopping, 
in which the legal standard to be applied to alleged 
abuse depends on the facts of the case, resulting in this 
instance on an emphasis on the effects of the conduct 
on consumer choice and speculation over the dominant 
undertaking’s malicious intent. By contrast, the FTC 
appears to have been cautious about moving beyond the 
customary consumer welfare standard of Section  2 by 
having chosen, for example, not to bring a standalone 
Section  5 case, in which it could have implemented 
a broader notion of consumer welfare, such as the 
consumer choice framework. 
87.  It remains to be seen whether the more inclusive 
ordoliberal legal standard for abuse of dominance that 
we infer to have been applied in the EU’s Google Search 
decision is a one-off  occurrence or instead prefigures 
a more significant departure by Europe’s competition 
authorities from the current post-Chicago trans-Atlantic 
consensus. Outside of the Google Search decision, trans-
Atlantic competition policy and enforcement priorities 
continue to converge on legal standards informed by 
U.S.-style welfare economics. The upcoming decision 
of the General Court, as well as the other Google cases 
(Android and AdSense), are all opportunities for greater 
clarity into the EU’s legal standards for abuse and how 
issues of consumer harm and harm to competition ought 
to be adjudicated. 
88. The second factor influencing the differing outcomes is 
that the economic analysis of the alleged anticompetitive 
effects appears to have been more developed in 
DG  COMP’s decision than in the FTC’s deliberations. 
The DG  COMP decision is rich in statistical graphs 
and tables demonstrating impediments to competition, 
whereas a similar level of analytical detail is absent from 
the internal FTC staff  memorandum, if  not from the 
deliberations as a whole.152 Moreover, with its narrower 
focus, DG  COMP could have had a simpler story of 
anticompetitive harm to substantiate through economic 
evidence. 
89.  Third, the FTC, in contrast to DG  COMP, was 
clearly more receptive to Google’s claims regarding 
dynamic efficiency and its positioning of Universal and 
the boxes as innovations that benefit end users. Thus, 
the consumer welfare effects and Google’s claimed 
countervailing efficiencies were given greater weight by 
the FTC, even though DG  COMP acknowledged that 
Google’s innovations benefit consumers, at least in the 
short term. Only a few pages of DG COMP’s decision 
were devoted to consumer harm and the prospect of 
counterbalancing efficiencies. The FTC appears to have 
deliberated the matter far more extensively, if  for no 
other reason than because it would have had to convince 
a court had it chosen to proceed. 
90.  Google’s appeal of DG  COMP’s decision to the 
General Court will provide further insight into the case 
and its merits. It is notable that DG  COMP had no 
appetite for indicating how Google might have acted 
differently or could have ended its abuse. The FTC 
might have taken this into account in anticipation of 
its burden before a court. Although antitrust in the 
EU and the U.S. are two separate sets of rules with 
separate ancestral lineages, the fundamentally different 
evaluation of otherwise identical facts indicates some 
potential lacunas in DG  COMP’s reasoning and calls 
into question its lack of openness. While the EU’s case 
will eventually be settled, the underlying fundamentals 
will persist on both sides of the Atlantic. The legacy left 
by the Google search cases may be one of open-ended 
choices and missed opportunities to fashion potentially 
more effective approaches to reckoning with consumer 
harm and welfare in the digital age. n
152  Presumably, the FTC’s Bureau of  Economics weighed in with a memorandum setting forth 
its own statistical analysis, but that document is not publicly available. Ce
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